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Summary findings
Orazem and  Vodopivec  identify winners and  losers in  wage variation  from occurring.  Wage minimums did not
Slovenia's economic transition  by tracing changes  in  appear  to have an effect,  presumably because inflation
returns  to education,  experience,  and gender and  reduced  real minimum  wages so quickly that  most
changes in wage  inequality from  1987 to 1991.  They  workers were  paid above the minimums.
find Ehat:  In Slovenia, policy changes are reflected  in labor
* Relative wages and  employment  rose for the most  market  outcomes. Disabling the tax-transfer  policy from
educated and  fell for the  least educated,  in all industries.  relatively profitable  to relatively unprofitable  firms and
*  Relative wages and employment  rose with years of  eliminating worker  referendums  on wage scales removed
work experience  until  pensionable age.  mechanisms that  tended to compress wage variation.
* At pensionable  age, relative wages increased very  Greater  demand for skilled workers also reflected borh
rapidly and  relative employment  was greatly  reduced.  the economywide  need [o cope with uncertainty  and
Using pension policies to encourage  early retirement  such industry-specific factors  as reduced labor demand,
drastically reduced  the supply of very experienced  especially in less skill-intensive industries.
workerr.  Either the  policy caused firms to bid up wages  The results in Slovenia contrast sharply with those in
for workers  of pensionable  age to  keep them from  eastem Germany. Eastern  German  workers  have had
retiring,  or it caused a selection process  in which  only the  decreasing returns  to education  and experience.  But it is
highest-paid  workers  remained  in the workforce.  not clear how relevant  the eastern  German  experience  is
Regardless, the  pension policy has proved to be costly,  to other transitional  economies  because of western
and early retirements  did not make room  for the  Germany's  efforts to alleviate problems.  More similar to
youngest werkers  but for those just under pensionable  Orazem and Vodopivec's  findings are the results of
age.  Flanagan (1993) on the Czech Republic, which show
*  Women gained relative to men in both wages and  increasing returns to educarion  but decreasing returns to
employment  primarily  because they occupy education  experience.
and  industry groups  less adversely affected by the  In some respects,  Slovenia is atypical because it is
transition,  not because of economvwide  reductions  in  richer  and more western  in orientation  than  other
discriminatKin against women.  transitional  economies.  But those  economies could learn
* Increasing returns  to education  and  experience  from  the experience  in Slovenia because Slovenia also
contributed  to wage inequality, but the variance in wages  had social ownership,  full employment  coupled with
also increased  for individuals with idenrical skills. Big  substantial hidden  unemployment,  and an egalitarian
changes in relative wages should signal future  wage structure.  And Slovenia has introduced  labor
reallocation  of labor toward  more productive,  higher-  market  reform and experienced  social dislocations
paying sectors.  similar to those in other transitional  European
*  Setting minimum wages, fixing ranges of pay, and  economies.
indexing  wages to inflation  did not prevent  increases in
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Drawing upon the writings of Marx, socialist governments sought to suppress the labor
market.  Labor supply mechanisms were constrained by making work a sacred duty of all members of
the socialist society.  Those who did not want to work were sentenced to compulsory  jobs.
Occupational and educational choices were centrally rationed, and geographic migration was restricted
by rationing housing and restricting the sale of property.  On the labor demand side, jobs were
provided for virtually everyone,  and firing was effectively forbidden.  Hiring and promotions were
driven by ideological criteria. To ensure egalitarian income distribution, and perhaps to disable
incentives for individuals to switch jobs or localities, economy-wide  wage rates were assigned for all
classes of jobs.  Commodity prices were also issued centally  with an emphasis on stability over time.
Consumer, producer and worker expectations were formed in a world of stable prices, stable wages,
stable labor demand and stable labor supply.
If there ever were a stationary state, it was the state economy.  It follows that the collapse of
the socialist economies caused a disequilibrium of epic proportion.  Transition economies faced a
complete disruption of the economic system driving price and wage determination, production and
consumption decisions, and expectation formation.  To varying degrees since then, the socialist
economies have been dismantling the mechanisms which held die labor market in check-  Workers
have been assigned the responsibility for finding work and the right to make occupational and
geographical choices.  Wages and prices were allowed to adjust to market forces.  Rewards were
allowed to follow successes and failures were allowed to occur.
T. W. Schultz (1975) argued forcefully that a stationary state does not require entrepreneurial
skill.  Economic systems characterized by constancy, -place no premium for the human ability to deal
with secular economic change-" 1 Systems in flux require this ability to perceive disequihlbrium  and
to reallocate rsources  accordingly. The gains from such reallocations are observable in wages and
'Schultz  (1975),  p. 832.2
profits. 2 If, as Schu!hz  posited, entrepreneurial ability is complemertary with education and work
experience, then relative returns to education should rise in the newly emerging market economies
relative to pretransition returns when entrepreneurial skills were not as needed.
There are many other ways in which the structure of earnings might change as a result of
transition to a market economy.  Competitive forces might be expected to remove arbitrary wage-
setting mechanisms which tend to discriminate against women or minorities.  On the other hand,
centrally planned economies were characterized by high relative wages and female labor force
participation rates compared to western economic..s If women did relatively well under socialism, one
might presume that women would lose in transition.  Egalitarian, centrally directed wage setting
would tend to reduce inequality.  Removal of these egalitarian  policies would be expected  to increase
wage inequality.  Their removal might also reduce relative earnings for minority groups and women
to the extent that a common wage formula might prevent discrimination  from occurring.
This study examines the winners and losers in Slovenia's transition by tracing out changes in
returns to education, experience, and gender and changes in wage inequality from 1987 to 1991. The
main finding is that retuns  to human capital rise dramatically  during transition.  Rising reurns  to
education and experience contribute to rising wage inequality, but the variance of wages increases for
individuals with identical skills as well.  Women gain relative to men, primarily because women
occupy sectors less adversely affected by the transition.  Effort  to use pension policies to encourage
retirements are shown to have drastically reduced labor supply of experienced workers of pensionable
age, contributing to large relative wage increases for workers of pensionable age and work
experience.
2Schultz  (1975),  p. 834. Schultz  stressed  that  presmed gains  to entrepreneurial  ability  during  periods  of change
are relative  gains, meaning  that it is not necessary  that entrepreneurs  be better off than they were before the
disequilibrium  for the  gains  to be realized. 'For people  to have  gains  from  their  resource  allocations  does  not imply
that they  are necessaily  better off  thn they were  prior to the  disequibrium, but it does  imply  that  their  economic
position  has been imprved  relative  to what it would  be if they  had stayed  in disequilibrium."3
* ;$ -The  Slovenian results are in sharp contrast to those in East Germany (Krueger and Pischke,
1992;  Bird, Schwartzc and Wagner, 1992).  East German workers have had decreasing returns to
education and experience.  However, it i3 not clear if the East German labor market has lessons for
other transitional economies because of West Germany's efforts to lessen the adverse effects of
transition. 3 Using grouped data, Flanagan (1993) found that returns to education rose in the Czech
republic during transition, but that retuns  to potential experience fell.
Setting East Germany aside as a unique case, the Slovenian data base offers the first chance to
examine the effects of transition on labor market returns based on individual data-  Although there
are respects in which Slovenia has been atypical (being among the richer and more western-oriented
of transitional economies), lessons learned from the Slovenian experience should be applicable
elsewhere.  The pretransition Slovenian labor market shared key features with those in other
formerly-socialist economies, most notably, social ownership, full employment coupled with
substatial  hidden unemployment, and an egalitarian wage structure.  Second, Slovenia has introduced
labor market reforms and has experienoed  dislocations that are similar to those of other European
transitional economies.
The study first reviews the labor market institutions which were in place before and during
transition.  The data is descrbed in section 2.  Empirical outcomes for wages and employment are
reported in sections 3 and 4. The study concludes with policy iimplications  derived from the analysis.
1.  INSTITUTIONAL  BACKGROUND
To put in perspective changes in wages and other labor market outcomes, it is necessary  first
to review the featres  of the previous self-management  system.  Subsequent labor market reforms can
3Pehaps  effi  best indicator  of the uniquerss of the East German  tansition is tbat real wages  rose
dramatically  for East German  workers  while  they  have  fallen  in every  other  formerly  sociaist economy.*  4
be viewed as relaxing  constraints  on labor  market  outcomes which were  imposed under  the earlier
system. The effectiveness  of the reforms  can be judged  by the extent  to which  labor market  outcomes
change  in directions  consistent  with the relaxation  of these constraints.
Labor Market Under Stif-Management
From the early 1950s  until the 1988/89  reforms,  Yugoslavia  maintained  a unique  social and
economic  system  known  as worker  self-management.'  The chief  characteristics  of the system  were
social ownership  of productive  assets  and worker  participation  in firm management.  Social
ownership  of productive  assets meant  that the government  could  interfere  direcly in firm
decisionmaking.  The most important  areas  of government  intrference were in determining
distribution  of firm earnings, restricting  sale of firm assets, and  preventing  employees  from
recovering  their investments  in the firm upon  termination  of employment.  On paper, worker  self-
management  gave  workers  a mandate  to participate  in many  aspects  of firm  decisionmaking.  In
practice, worker participation was concentated in detemining relative pay within the fm.
The absence  of explicit  property  rights  under  social ownership,  as well  as the commitment  to
self-management,  dictated  a specific  wage  setting  mechanism.  Both  government  and workers  had
clearly  delineated  roles in the wage  setting  process. In the absence  of an advocate  for capital, the
govenment set the firm's wage  biff. The government's  objective  was to even out differences  in pay
among  firms. Special  regulations  termed "social  agreements"  laid out a detailed  methodology  for
determining  each  fir:'s  "socially  -waranted"  wage  bill.
In the late 1980s,  the methodology  involved  computation  of a business  success  index  for each
firm.  The index depended  positively  on firm income  per worker and  per unit of capital  stock. The
indices  were then adjusted  by a special  correction  factor. The adjusted  indices  dampened  the
'Until achieving  independence  in October  1991,  Slovenia  was  one of the six constiten  republics  of
Yugoslavia.5
measured  busimess  success  for above-average  firms  and raised  measured  success  for below-average
firms. The socially  warranted  wage  bill was then  computed  based  on the adjusted  firm  success
indices. Oher things  being  equal,  wages  in a firm with an unadjusted  success  index  60 percent  above
average  would  be only 25 percent  above  average,  while  wages  in a firm  with an unadjusted  success
index  40 percent  below  average  would  be only 19  percent  below  average  (Vodopivec,  1993).
Further  leveling  of wages  across  firms  was achieved  through  a massive  firm income
redistribution  policy  implemented  by discretionary  taxation  and subsidization  of enterprises. Paying
wages  strictly  according  to the socially  warranted  wage  bill meant  that proportionally  more income
was retained  by above-average  firms  than  below-average  firms. Government  control  of the
distribution  of firm income  created  numerous  channels  by which  income  could  be shifted  from above-
average  to below-average  firms. For _xample,  below-average  firms  whose  socially  warranted  wage
bills exhausted  their  earnings  were exempted  from taxes  and qualified  for subsidies  (chief  among
them, concessionary  financing). These  subsidies  were fianced by discretionary  taxes  on firms  with
above-average  business  success. The magnitude  of these  discretionary  redistributive  flows  was
staggering,  exceeding  by several  times formal  taxes  and  formal  subsidies. 5
The financing  of redistributive  flows  among  firms,  together  with the methodology  for setting
the firms wage  bill that had a built-in  indexation,  proved  to be destabilizing.  On top of social
agreements  on firms income  distribution,  in the 1970s  and 1980s  Yugoslav  government  had  to
repeatedly  impose  additional  limits  on wage  increases. For example,  during  the period of
investigation,  an incomes  policy  law  was in effect  in 1988,  mandating  wage  bills not  to exceed  140
percent  of the wage  bills in the previous  years.
5For  a definiton  of  redistributive  flows  among  firns and  their  quantification  for  Slovenian  firms  in 1986,
see Vodopivec  (1993).6
Once the government set the wage bill, the workers' role was to set individual wages within
the firm.  The wage scale was determined by a referendum of employees." Theoretically, pay
depended also -on  supervisors' assessments of work quality and fulfillment of work norms, but in
reality the wage scale was decisive.  In comparison to capitalist firms, Yugoslav firms had extremely
compressed wage scales. For example, in one establishment  with several thousand workers, the pay of
the highest paid manager was 4.54 times that of the lowest paid laborer.  To put that range in
perspective, the pay range of entry-level positions in U.S. state governments is of similar magnitude
to the pay range across all experience groups in the self-managed  Yugoslav firm, and U.S. state
governments have relatively compressed pay at the upper range of skills.'  In the same Yugoslav
firm, a worker with 20 years of job tenure earned just 6.2 percent more than a worker with no job
tenure.  In contrast, Topel (1991) found that a U.S. worker with 20 years of job tenure was paid
almost 34 percent more than a novice worker.
As in other socialist economies, Yugoslav workers had strong job security.  In fact, job
security in Yugoslavia was constitutionally  guaranteed.  Except for extremely rare cases of
bankruptcy, workers could be fired only for breaching work discipline or refusing job reassignment
Even such dismissals were hindered by a judicial system that clearly sided with workers.  Moreover,
to prevent unemployment, government pressed frms  to hire.  Unlike the rest of Yugoslavia where
hiring was mandated by law, only informal hiring pressure was applied to Slovenian firms.  Similar
to other socialist economies and in contrast to the rest of Yugoslavia, unemployment  was negligible in
Slovenia until the late 1980s.
6The  theorefical  foundation  for such  a scale  was sought  in Marx's concept  of 'degree of complexity  of
labor' (number  of units  of simple  labor  that is required  fora unit of complex  labor),  the  concept  that finns' internal
documents  elaborated  in detail  by providing  numerous  evaluation  criteria.
7The  data on the Yugoslav  firm is tken  from -Vodopivec  (1992). Data on pay ranges in U.S. state
governments  are from  Orazem,  Matila and Weikwm  (1993),  Table  3.7
Comparison with Other Socialist Eeonomies.  Although Slovenia's wage controls differed
from those in other socialist economies, they produced very similar wage distributions.  As in
Slovenia, other socialist economics leveled  wages across firms and maintained  job and wage security
through interfirm redistribution, manipulating prices, taxes, and subsidies, and concessionary
finance.'  In contrast to Slovenia, however, determination of relative wages in other economies was
centrally imposed through the so-called tariff system.  Jobs were classified into different skill grades
(the "skill-exertion matrices") tU  which economywide wage rates were centrally assigned.  Because
central planners imposed egalitarian pay structure, both preferences of planners in other socialist
economies and democratic determination of wages in Slovenia contributed to the same outcome -
egalitarianism.  Indeed, a comparison of earnings distributions for economies in Central Europe
slows that Slovenia's net earnings distribution in 1989 did not deviate much from those in other
planned economies.  In 1989, just before the transition started, Slovenia's earnings distribution was
more egalitarian than Hungary's, but less egalitarian than Czechoslovakia's  or Poland's (Table 1).
Labor Market Reforms During the Transition
While Slovenia was sdll a constituent republic, Yugoslavia made a decisive step toward the
creation of market economy in late 1988- The Law on Enterprises transferred decisionmaking rights
from workers to equity owners, thus formally ending dhe  era of self-management.9 Important
changes occurred both in wage and employment policies, as well as labor market programs.  Many
measures adopted in Slovenia are strikingly similzr to measures that have been adopted in other
former socialist countries undergoing transition to a market economy.
'Leveling  effects  of redistribution  have  been  found,  for example,  for Hungary  (Kornai  and Matits,  1987),
and for Poland  (Schaffer,  1990).
'Implementation  of privatization  finally was passed in November  1992 after a two-year  delay.  See
PleskDvic  and Sachs  (1994)  for a discussion  of privatization  legislation.;t. ;--  -
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Wage Setting. The old wage  setting  mechanism  was replaced  by a system  witlithree
components:  the Labor Code,  collective  bargaining,  and incomes  policy.  The Yugoslav  Labor Code
was instituted  in October  1989  and amended  by the Slovenian  Assembly  in February  1991.  The
Labor Code  removed  administrative  constraints  and collective  decisionmaking  from wage
determination,  leaving  wage determination  as a managerial  responsibility.'°  This disabled  the
governmental  mechanism  which served  to equalize  pay across  establishments  and the worker
referendum  mechanism  W;iCL served to equalize  pay  within  establishments.  Managerial  discretion  to
set pay was not absolute,  however. The Code  established  a minimum  wage, to be adjusted  at least
biannually  to reflect  changes  in living  costs. The law  also intrcduced  collective  bargaining,  a
genuinely  new component  of wage setting. The first general  collective  agreement  for Slovenia  was
ratified  in August  1990. It classified  workers  into nine  categories  and prescribed  the minimum  basic
wage  for each  category. The basic  wage  for the highest  category  was three  times  that of the lowest
category. However,  firms in bad financial  standing  had the right to reduce  the minimum  basic  wage
levels  by up to 20 percent. The Code  also liberalized  returns  to job tenure. The suggested  wage
increased  at one-half  percentage  points  per year of job tenure. Thus, the suggested  return to twenty
years of job tenure  rose from 6.2 to ten percent,  still well  below  the average  return to job tenure  in
Western  economies,  but much  higher than returns  under  socialism.
The wage-setting  system  continued  incomes  policies  from the previous  system. These  policies
were imposed  twice  since 1990. The 1990/91  incomes  policy  law required  paying  a portion  of the
"'To rid  themselves  of worker  councils,  some  social  enterprises  have  tanmsrred  their  assets  and  workers,
and  thus  all of their  operations,  to a newly  created  subsidiary  that  is considered  a private  company  and  thus  need
not have  a worker  council. In these  cases, the parent  enteprise is transformed  into  a purely  financial  institution
(see  Komze  1991).9
wage  bill in internal  shares  of the enterprise. The 1991  law  tied the growth  of the wage  bill to the
growth  of the costs of living. The law  called for wages  to grow less  than  the rate  of inflation  if
prices rose faster  than five percent  per month. It also limited  managerial  salary  to be no greater  than
flfeen times  the minimum  wage."
Wage  policies  which  set minimum  pay, index  wages  to inflation,  and fix the allowable  range
of pay within firms  would  tenid  to compress  wages. However,  it is doubtful  that pay compression
would  be as severe as under  the worker  self-management  system. Indeed,  it is not clear if these
policies  were effective  at all.  In inflationary  environments,  even  biannual  adjustments  to minimum
wages  to accommodate  past inflation  would  quickly  drop in ieal value,  so it may  be that  few  workers
were paid mandated  minimums. Monthly  inflation  exceeded  five percent  about  one-half  of the months
during the period, so indexation  only partially  compensated  for changes  in cost-of-living.  The
stipulated  pay ranges  were actually  larger than  pay ranges  that existed  under  worker  self-management,
so even  if they were effective  they  would  not constrain  pay variation. In addition,  if the stipulated
pay ranges  achtally  constrained  managerial  ability  to raise pay, management  could raise  total
compensation  through  perquisites. Heuristic  evidence  suggests  that nonpecuniary  compensation  has
been  used  to top off pay beyond  the range limitations.
Employment  Policies  and Practices. In October  1989,  legislation  gave employers  the right
to lay off workers. However,  there were still significant  constraints  on firing which  limited  its use by
firms.  The firm was required  to provide  24 months  prior notice  of a layoff,  place  the worker  in
another  firm, rerain the worker  with pay, or purchase  pension  credits  to allow  the worker  to retire
"When  the  Incomes  Policy  Law  expired  in February  1992,  there  was  fierce  opposition  to its exteson.
Trade  unions,  its main  opponent, argued  that  the  existence  of collective  bargaining  made  separate  legal  restrictions
on the wage  bill not only unnecessary,  but counterproducdve  - because  they  conflicted  with colective  agreemnts.
Instead  of new incomes  policy  law, less stingent incomes  policies  introduced  as collective  bargaining  agreemems
were in place  after 1992.early.  In February 1991, advance notification was shortened to six months, but the cost of a layoff
was still high.'
Before April 1992, men qualified for old-age pension at 60 years of age or 40 years of work
experience, and women at 55 years of age or 35 years of work experience.  Pensions were set at 85
percent of the pension base.  The base was the average of the ten highest annual inflation-adjusted
incomes in the pensioner's career.  To reduce the inflow into unemployment, the government in 1990
began to promote early retirements by reimbursing enterprises for a fraction of the costs associated
with the purchase of retirement credits for early retirees.  Early retirement at reduced pension levels
was made available to men with 55 years of age and 35 years of work experience, and to women with
50 years of age and 30 years of work experience.  As a consequence of both the increase of the flow
into retirement and falling employment and production, the burden of pensions has escalated
enormously.  The share of public pension expenditures in GDP skyrocketed from 9.3 percent in 1989
-to 11.1 in 1991 to  13.9 percent in 1993:  Following the surge in retirements, the 1992 law instituted
a gradual increase in pensionable age to 63 for men and 58 for women by 1997.
Labor Market  Reforms in Other Transitional  Economies.  As a key component of the
current reforms, other transitional economies have also overhauled  their labor market legislation
Similar to Slovenia, they enacted redundancy legislation, thus ending the era of virtally  complete  job
security; allowed for independence  of enterprises in hiring and wage decisions; and introduced
unemployment  insurance and active labor market programs, to cope with the growing number of
unemployed.
In the area of wage setting, the reforms in other economies are quite similar to those in
Slovenia.  Above all, as in Slovenia, the authority to set wages has been transferred to managers.  All
'Detailed discussion  of these  and  other  Slovenian  employment,  unmnployment  compensation,  and redundany
policies  is contained  in Vodopivec  and Eribar-Milic  (1993).other  Eastern  European  countries  have  also introduced  incomes  policies. These policies  - usually
variants  of tax-based  incomes  policie - have  typically  been in place  for short durations  and later
renegotiated,  often in somewhat  different  form.  Collective  bargaining  has also emerged,  with similar
confrontation  among  unions  for worker  representation,  as in Slovenia. Moreover,  minimum  wage
scales  for different  categories  of labor, such  as those  in Slovenia,  have  been  agreed  upon in Bulgaria,
Poland,  and Romania.
In many  respects, other  economies  have  chosen  less  generous  and less  protective  policies  dtan
Slovenia. One  example  is job security. Czech  and Polish  workers  are given advance  notice  of up to
tee  months,  and Romanian  workers  one month  - compared  to Slovenia's  six months." 3 Similarly,
Slovenian  workers  are entitled  to severance  pay of one month's  wage  for each  two years of  job
tenure,  while in most Central  and Eastern  European  economies  severance  pay amounts  to up to two
mounth's  pay.  The maximum  duration  of this unemployment  benefit  in all other  transitional  economies
*  is 12 months  (only  six in the Czech  republic  and former  Soviet  Union  economies),  compared  to the
maximum  duration  of 24 months in Slovenia.
The pension  replacement  rate in Slovenia  has also been  the largest  among  transitional
economies. In 1992,  average  pension  amounted  to 76 percent  of average  wage,  compared  to 64
percent  in Poland  and 50 percent in Bulgaria  and Hungary. Slovenia's  public  expenditures  on
pensions  as a percent  of GDP have  been  among  the highest  in transitional  economies. Only  Poland  at
14.7  percent  of GDP has a higher  pension  burden. Government  sponsored  early retirement  programs,
similar  to Slovenia's,  have  been introduced  in Poland,  Romania,  and, to a lesser  degree,  in Hungary.
3Luformation  on ocher  economies  is taken  from  the following  sources:  Burda  (1993);  Scarpetta,  Boeri  and
Reutersward  (1993);  Earle  and  Oprescu  (1993);  and  World  Bank  PRDTE's  data  bank  on taitional  economies.12
To assess how these myriad changes  affected  the Slovenia labor market, it is necessary  to
have data from periods predating the reforms as well as data from periods after the reforms were in
place.
2.  DATA SOURCES
Our main data base is taken from earnings records of the Slovenian  Pension and Invalid Fund
(SPIF), collected for pension benefit calculation. Three additional data sources are used: the work
history of employees covered by the social security system, data on unemployment  spells of registered
unemployed,  and the register of enterprises.  The data provide a cross-section  of employees  for each
year from 1987  through 1991.
SPIF collects data on earnings for all workers who are paying contributions  to the Fund-
Similar to other transitional economies, old-age  insurance is mandatory so virhually  all workers are
covered.  In our analysis, however, we focus only on wages paid in social enterprises, thus excluding
employers who are able to 'adjust" reported earnings of their employees. The main two groups that
are excluded from the data set are self-employed  and workers in private enterprises. Self-mployed
may opt either to underreport their eamings so as to reduce their old-age  contribution, or overreport
their earnings so as to increase the pension level.  Similar opportunities  to adjust reported income
may exist in private enterprises.  Moreover, in our data set only jobs for which contrbutions to social
security are paid are included  For multiple  jobholders, moonlighting  or secondary  jobs rarely pay
into the social security fund, and are thus excluded. For such multiple  jobholders, our measure  of the
wage is the wage in the prnmary  job alone.
Observations  on work spells were drawn from a random sample of employees  representing
about five percent of the social sector.  The social sector covered 92.6 percent of nonagricukural
employment  in 1987 and 89.8 percent in 1991. Of the .028 decline in the social sector share, .016 is==.  1e:.;
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attnbutable to lost employment  in the social sector and .012 to increased  employment  in the private
-1  =-  f  sector. 'Useable observations on workspells ranged from 30,474 in 1987 to 21,198 in 1991. The
decline in useable observations  is due primarily to the 20 percent decline  in social sector employment
from 1987 through 1991. A lag in SPIF resolution of irregularities in data provided by firms
contributed  to a smaller useable sample in 1991. As the measurement  errors are apparently  random,
the 1991  useable sample should still be representative. Details on sample selection and data base
constucion  are included in an Appendix.
The earnings data include information  on earnings, regular and overtime hours, and the
starting and ending date of the employment  spell within the year.  Hourly wage is computed as
earnings divided by hours.  For workers who switch employers  during the year, hourly wage is
computed  separately for each employment  spell.
3.  EMhPIRICAL  FORMULATION AND RESULS  OF WAGE EQUATIONS
To summarize how the earnings structure in Slovenia  changed  during transition, we apply the
standard  earnings function approach  pioneered by Mincer (1974) to the Slovenia data described
above. The dependent  variable is W,: the natural logarithm  of average hourly earnings over a spell.
The vector of independent  variables, X, includes a set of dummy variables indicating different levels
of formal education, years of employment, a dummy variable  designating  nonSlovene  ethnicity,
dummny  variables indicating  if the individual  is in a temporary or internship  position,  a set of dammy
variables for industry of employment,  and a set of monthly dummy  variables indicating  the months in
which the individual  worked.
Given that wages are computed over the employment  spell, monthly dummy variables are
used to control for changes in consumer  prices over the spell. Because  of inflation, nominal wages
and prices in the first half of the year differed significantly  from nominal wages and prices in the last14
half of the year. This problem  was  particularly  acute  during  the hyperinflation  of the last quarter  of
1989. The use of monthly  dummies  controls  for within  year inflation,  allowing  the coefficients  of the
earnings  function  to be interpreted  in real  terms.
The wage  equations  will be used  to explore  four issues  related  to the effects  of economic
transition  on the labor  market. The first of these  is the effect  of transition  on returns  to education.
The second  is the effect  on returns  to job experience. The third is how  earnings  inequality  changed  in
general,  and  how inequality  changed  con-trolling  for levels  of human  capital. The final issue  is
whether  wage  differentials  between  men  and women  narrowed  or increased  as a result of the
economic  tranition.  As we will argue  in more detail  below,  the observed  changes  in wage  structure
for Slovenia  are quite similar  to those  observed  in market-oriented  economies  over the past twenty
years.  In addition,  as in the western  economies,  the main causes  for observed  changes  appear  to be
associated  with shifts in labor demand. The difference  between  Slovenia  and the western  economies
is that the changes  in wage  structure  occurred  much  more  rapidly  in Slovenia  and that they  seem  to be
related  to Slovenias transition  to a market  ec-onomy.
The wage  functions  for men  and women  (designated  by subscripts  M and F respectively)  in
year t can be written as:
(1)  Wm. =XhBm+  e,
=p  4BOF  +  e,Ft,
where e; is an  error  term.  Chages  in the earings  structure over tune are measured by changes in
the coefficients,  Bli, The joint restriction,  that over two periods  t and f , Bi,  =  Bir  can be tested  to
establish  whether  changes  in the earnings  structure  are statistcally  significant. Such tests can also  be
performed for subsets of the coefficients  which are of particula  interest, namely those on the
education and experience variables.  Reports of these coefficients  and the associated tests of structral
change are reported in Table 2.15
The regressions reveal dramatic changes in the structure of earnings.  The overall explanatory
power of the regression falls as wage setting became less standardized  across firms and industries.
Individual coefficients changed dramatically, the general pattern revealing a sharp increase in returns
to human capital.  There were no significant changes in returns to ethnicity or term of employment.
Nevertheless, the null hypothesis that the eleven reported coefficients were unchanged-  from 1987 to
1991 was easily rejected in both the male and female wage equations.  In contrast to the U.S. and
western Europe where the interindustry pattern of relative wages has been nearly constant over time,
there were sharp changes in the coefficients on industry dummy variables.' 4 These changes were
identical in sign and similar in magnitude across the male and female equations.  Holding human
capital measures fixed, relative wages rose in agriculture, services, health and government, but fell in
construction and education.
Returns to Education.  The coefficients on the education dummy variables tell a very
consistent story.  Average returns to years of education rose dramatically following transition relative
to earnings of the least educated group.  The changes in relative returns to education are virtualiy
identical for men and women.  Those with four years of university education  gained the most in
relative earnings, followed by those with two years of university training.  The educated  group that
gained the least relative to the least educated over this period were holders of vocational degrees.
This finding is consistent with Flanagan's (1993) argument that vocational  training was
overemphasized  in the controlled economies of central and eastern Europe.  It is important to
emphasize that the relative gains reported herein are not absolute gains.  As shown below, the
increase in relative reurns  to schooling occur because the most educated faced the lowest proportional
decline in real wages.
4See  Katz  and Krueger  (1989)  and Krueger  and Summers  (1988)  for international  evidence  of the existence  of
long wrm  inter-industry  wage  differentials  in Western  economics.16
Figure 1 charts the relative wages of full-time; year round workers by educational group,
using those with less  an  an elementary degree as the base' 5. Lch  ratio is normalized to be one in
1987 so that changes in the height of the ratio are interpretable as percentage changes in relative
earnings for the group.  The figure shows that relative earnings for the most educated were rising
slightly in 1988, but then changed dramatically after the transition began in 1989.  Those with four
year university degrees gained 27 percent relative to those with less than an elementary education.
Equally remarkable is that the proportional changes in relative earnings in Slovenia over this period
are larger than the dramatic increases in relative returns to college graduates in the United States
observed over the same period. 16
Returns  to Experience.  Consistent  wit  the results on education, retums to the most
experienced rise relative to those with the least experience.  As with returns to education, returns to
expenence change in similar ways for men and women.  The linear term becomes less positive and
the quadratic term becomes less negative, meaning that marginal returns to a year of experience fall
for the least experienced but rise for the most experienced. In fact  the wage-experience  profile for
women tins  convex in 1991.  This outcome is not just a fiction of the quadratic approximation. In
Figure 2, the coefficients on. a series of dummy variables representing progressive four-year
experience increments pooled across men and women reveals the same pattern.  Relative to 1987, the
wage-experience profile is flatter over the first eight years, but is steeper thereafter.  There is a
IPa-year  workers  were paid very different  nominal  wages  dependig upon  the timg  of their employment
wihin the  year. Use  of the  sample  of year-round  workers  removes  the  artificial  inrease i  wa  vanation  caused
by inflton.
16 Using  CPS  data for the U.S.,  over the 1984-1991  period,  relative  annual  eanings for those  with 16 years
of education  rose 25 perent  relative to elementary  school graduates. In fact, real salaries  for U&S  college
graduates  were  decitmug  over the  period,  but salaries  for the  elemeLtary  school  graduates  were  declining  even  more.
More  detailed  analysis  of changes  in inequality  of earnings  across  skill groups  in the U.S. are in Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce (1993)  and Katz and Murphy  (1992). Levy  and Mumnane  (1993)  provide  an extensive  review  of the
topic.17
dramatic  increase  in returns  to experience  beginning  at 28 years.-  This sharp  increase  in returns  may
reflect  the general  increase  in relative  returns  to human  capital  discussed  thus far, but additional
reasons  related  to pension  policy  may also have  an effect. These  reasons  will be discussed  in more
detail  below.
Inequality. To the extent  that controlled  economies  were successful  in suppressing
inequality,  relaxation  of central  government  controls  would  be expected  to increase  the dispersion  of
income  in the economy. This expected  dispersion  occurred  in Slovenia. Figure  3 contains  a mapping
of the distribution  of wages  for year-round  full-time  workers  in 1987  and 1991. To correct  for the
large  changes  in currency  value,  the 1991  wages  were deflated  by the ratio  of median  wages  in 1991
to median  wage  in 1987. This has the effect  of forcing  the median  of the two distributions  to be
equal,  making  it easier to visualize  changes  in the distribution  of wages. It is clear that the variance
of wages  has increased. The distribution  is much  less  peaked  in 1991  than in 1987, and the
distribution  has become  further  skewed  to the left. Moreover,  there is a larger number  of workers  at
the upper  tail of the distnbution  as well.  Given  our earlier  results  on experience  and education,  one
would  presume  that the upper  tail is disproportionately  populated  by those  with greater  skills.
Not only has the distribution  becorae  more unequal,  but the gap  between  the richest  and
poorest  has increased. Figure  4 shows  the percentage  change  in real  wages  from 1987  to 1991  by
percentile  in the wage  distribution. All percentage  changes  are negative,  indicating  that real  wages
declined  at all points  in the wage  distribution. However,  the largest  percentage  reductions  are for
those  at the bottom  of the wage  distribution. As percentile  position  in the wage  distribution  increases,
the percentage  wage  reduction  decreases  monotonically.  By 1991,  wages  at the tenth percentile  were
56 percent  of the wage  earned  by those  at the tenth percentile  in 1987. In contrast,  those at the
median  in 1991  earned  64 percent  of the wage  earned  by the median  workers  in 1987,  while  those  at18
the nineteth percentile carned  70 percent of the wage earned by those at the ninetieth percentile in
1987.. The upper tail gained relatively because they lost less relative to 1987.
An issue that has been studied extensively  in the United States and in western Europe is rising
inequality  within narrowly defined skill groups as well as between these groups. Coefficients  of
variation for education groups, experience groups, and males and females are reported in Table 3.
These statistics are computed over a sample of full-time, year-round workers.  The results show
increases in the variance of earnings for the lowest and highest educated  groups and for the highest
experience groups.  Measures of rising inequality  were nearly identical for men and women.
However, there was no evidence of rising inequality for middle or vocational school graduates or for
those with less than 20 years of job experience.
Within individual industries, wages have become more variable across firms and across skills.
An analysis of variance in wages within six individual industries of the sort employed by Groshen
(1991) revealed that the proportion of within-industry  wage variation attributable to differences in
mean wages across firms rose from 22 percent in 1987 to 38 percent in 1991.17  The variance
attributable to differences in mean wages across education groups rose from 22 to 29 percent.  On the
other hand, the proportion of wage variation explained by within-establishment  fttors  fell from 23
percent to 15 percent.  The unplication is that firm and skill-level fctors  have become more
important in determining pay, but that internal labor markets within finms are becoming less
important.
An overall measure of inequality which holds constant all variables in the earnings function is
the standard error of the regression.  The standard error for the male earnings function is designated
by «M,  and that for the female earings  function is designated  by  ,;.  By construction, the residuals of
r'The  six industries  are  nomnmetallic  products,  metallic  products,  machinery,  furniture,  paper.  and  textiles. The
reported  percentages  of vage variation  explained  by firm-  and occupation-specific  effects  are weighted  averages  of
the effects  found  for individual  industries.19
the  earnings  function  are uncorrelated  with observed  differences  in human  capital,  industry  of
occupation,  ethnicity,  and price level,  meaning  that aM  and OF  measure  wage inequality  for workers
--  who  are identic  in observed  characteristics.  The results  show  that for both men  and women,
residual  wage  inequality  increased  dramatically  following  the 1989  transition.
Male-Female  Earnings Differentials.  Compared  to women  in Western  economics,  women  in
socialist  countries  had high labor  force participation  rates  and high relative  wages. Slovenia  was no
exception. In 1987,  the female  labor  force participation  rate  was .75, compared  to .54 in Austria,  .55
in West  Germany  and .68 in the United  States. Women  in Sloveuia  were paid 88 percent  of what
men were paid, a much  higher  ratio than in Austria  (.73), West  Germany  (.69)  or the U.S. (.68).
Given  that women  did so well  under  socialism,  it may  seem  natural  to presume  that women  could
only do worse under  a market  system. This presumption  will be examined  in this section.
Table  4 reports estimates  of the differences  in coefficients  between  the male  and female  wage
equations  for each  year from 1987  to 1991. Positive  differences  imply  that the coefficient  in the
female  equation  is greater  than  the coefficient  in the male  equation. Results  indicate  that women  had
higher marginal  returns  to education  and steeper  returns  to experience  than did men. Alter  the
transition,  the male and female  earnings  structures  became  much  more  similar. The only  exception  is
that women's  wage  experience  profiles  became  steeper. The F-statistic  of the null hypothesis  that  the
male and female  earnings  functions  had identical  coefficients  fell monotonically  from 11.3 in 1987  to
4.2 in 1991. The F-statistic  on the null hypothesis  that the eleven  human  capital,  ethnicity  and term
of employment  coefficients  were the same  fell monotonically  from 8.2 to 3.2.  The implication  is that
transition  led to lower  differences  in the pricing  of male and female  characteristics,  an outcome
consistent  with theories  of how  increased  labor  market  mobility  and market  competition  would  affect
wages.20
Following  the methodology  developed  by Juhn, Murphy  and Pierce  (1993),  the effects  of
economic  transition  on earnings  differences  between  males  and females  can be explored  in more
detail. Given  that male and female  eamings  functions  and their error variances  changed  in similar
ways, we can arbitrarily  selept  the male eamings  structure  to represent  the returns  to skill in the
economy. We can then  compare  how female  earnings  changed  relative  to male earnings. The male-
female  earnings  difierentiaus  can be decomposed  as follows: First, the male  earnings  function  (1) can
be rewritten  as
(2)  WMt =  XMSIMt  +  0 Mow,,
where °e  is the standard deviation of the residual of the male eamings function in year t, and GM1  =
eCtIM,  is the standardized  residual  of the regression. By constiuction,  Gt  has mean zero  and
varance 1.
Taking  the difference  in wages  between  men and women  in year  t, one can obtain:
(3)  dt=  (Xm  - x)m,  +  (9e,  - 0,
where e  ,=  (W,  - X,JLJ/aM. The numerator is the difference between the wage paid to a woman
and,the  wage  she would  be paid if she were rewarded  for her charactcristics  at the same  rate as a
man. This difference  is interpretable  as a measure  of wage  discrimination.  IfO  BM  =  BF. the
difference  will have a mean  of zero. More typically,  this value is negative,  which  implies  that
women  are paid less than men  with the same  characteristics.  Deflating  this difference  by the male
standardized  residual  yields  the number  of male residual  standard  deviations  that the average  woman
is paid below zero, the value of OMt  for the average man.
The earnings  differential  for another  year, t', would  be
(4)  dr =  (XmA  - Xft-)IMt +  (OMAe  - (eP)dtr
so that the change  in the wage  differential  over time becomes
(5)  d[  X  - d>  [(X  We  Xm)  (XFR)  XJ)me  +  (XMt  -XFJ(8w  - 4+ [(Mr -00  -(GM (Ar.,+ (Oe,  - er.)-  4'--  0
This is the Blau and Kahn decomposition. The first tenn captures how the male-femiale  earnings
differential  changed in response to changes  in the male-female  gap in characteristics. The second
term measures  how changes in the retuns to these characteristics  affected  the wage gap. The third
term represents  how the change in women's relative position in the male residual earnings distribution
affected  the pay gap."  The fourth term shows how increases in the standard deviation  of the
residual earnings distribution affects the male-female  wage gap.  Blau and Kahn label these four
effects "Observed  X's",  "Observed  Prices", "Gap",  and "Unobserved  Prices", respectively.
This decomposition  was computed  for three years, 1989 versus 1987, 1991 versus 1989, and
1991  versus 1987. The 1987 and 1991 regressions  are reported in Table 2 and the 1989 results are
available  from the authors on request. In addition, summary results for all five years are reported.
Summary  statistics for the five years of data  are reported in Table 5.  As noted earlier, the
female-male  wage ratio of .88 in Slovenia  was very high compared to ratios ranging from .61 to .77
for westem economies at about the same time."  Nevertheless, the log wage gap fell 23 percent
from 1987  to 1991, from .13 to .10.  This implies that  the Slovenian female-male  wage ratio rose
from .88 in 1987 to .90 in 1991. In 1987, median female earnings were at the 35th percentile of the
male wage distribution, but at the 40th percentile in 1991. In contrast, the median female wage in the
United States is at the 31st percentile of the male wage distribution.?
Examining residual inequality  after controlling  for human capital, ethnicity, part-time status,
and industry of employment lowers the relative position of women in the male residual earnings
"Note that  at sample  means,  this equals  (OR  - 0,,)aMr  since  0.  O,z =  0 at male  sample  means.
"=lau and Kahn, 1992.
SBhU  and  Kahn,  1994.22
distribution. While  women  were at the 40th percentile  in the observed  earnings  distribution,  they
were only at the 30th to 33rd percentile  of the residual  earnings  distribution. 2'
In western  economies,  male advantages  in work experience,  job tenure, and proportion  with
college  training  serve to explain  some  of the pay difference  between  men  and women. In Slovenia,
the opposite  holds. Women  do worse in the residual  distribution  than in the observed  distribution.
The main reason  appears  to be that women  had superior  education. Women  were less likely  than  men
to have less  than an elementary  education  or a vocational  degree, the two educational  categories  that
performed  worst throughout  the transition.  On the other hand  women  were more likely  to hold middle
school  or university  degrees,  the educational  categories  that did best in the transition.
Nevertheless,  both the observed  and  the residual  wage  data indicate  that  women  rose from
four to five percentage  points  in the male  wage  distribution  over the five year period  spanning  the
Slovenian  transition. In contrast,  Blau  and Kahn(1994)  reported  a 5.5 percentage  point  gain  for U.S.
women  ovar a twelve  year  period from 1975  through  1987.
At the bottom  of Table  5, the changes  in male-female  wage  differentials  are decomposed  into
the four components. Negative  numbers  indicate  factors  that are increasing  women's  pay  relative  to
men's pay.  Over the five year  period, the first three terms  serve  to reduce  wage  differentials  between
men  and women,  while  the fourth term  which  captures  the effect  of increasing  inequality  in the
residual  wage  distribution  raises the gender  wage  gap.  Almost  all of the changes  in the wage  gap
occur  after 1989. Although  there were nontrivial  values  for the last three terms  in the 1987-1989
period,  they canceled  each other  out.  For the full period, the greatest  impact  occurred  through  the
gap effect  with women  gaining  by moving  up the male residual  earnings  distrbution. The next
largest  effect  was from increasing  inequality  in the residual  wage  distribution. Because  women  were
21B1au  and  Kahn's  estmates  for  the  sample  of  westem  economies  show  female  percentile  sus  in male  residual
earnings  distributions  varying  from  .16 in West  Germany  to .31  in Austria.23
in the lower  tail of the distribution,  they lost relative  to men  from the inA.-ease  in inequality. Much
smaller  relative  gains  to women  came  from narrowing  differences  in labor  market  characteristics  and
from changes  in returns  to characteristics  that favored  women  relative  to men.
In terms of more  traditional  wage  decompositions,  the first two terms sum to explained
differences  while the last two sum to unexplained  differences  in wages  between  men and women.
Based  on that decomposition,  eighty-seven  percent  of the improvement  in women's  earnings  relative
to men  is attributable  to changes  in observed  characteristics  and  observed  returns  to those
characteristics.  There is evidence  of a decline  in wage  discrimination  in the 1989-1991  period,  but
the increase  in the unexplained  component  from 1987  to 1989  is of nearly  equal magnitude.
4.  CHANGES  IN EMPLOYMENT
The large changes  in returns  to education,  experience,  and  gender  as well as the increase  in
inequality  within and between  human  capital  groups  may  be due to changes  in labor  demand  or labor
supply. Numerous  policy  changes  could have  altered  firms' incentives  to hire workers  or workers'
incentives  to enter or remain  in the labor  force. In the spirit of what Levy  and Murnane  (1993)
called  the Economics  I test, we can trace out changes  in relative  employment  in relation  to changes  in
relative  wages.'  Rising  wages  and employinent  imply  demand-side  factors  dominate,  while  rising
wages  with falling  employment  imply supply-side  factors  prevail. There are reasons  to suspect
demand-side  factors  predominate. Major  disruptions  in industrial  production  accompanied  the
transition. The movement  away  from cross-subsidization  of less profitable  firms by more  profitable
firms and large disruptions  in trade caused  by the disintegration  of markets  elsewhere  in former
Yugoslavia  caused  large industry-specific  shocks  to labor  demand. If these  labor demand  shocks  are
'2Levy  and  Murnane,  p. 1342. See  Katz  and  Murphy  (1992)  for  a multivariate  applicaion  of the  Economy  1
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driving the changes in returns to skill, it inay be because lo"w  skilled labor was disproportionately
employed in the sectors most adversely affected  by the transition.  However, if the Schultz hypothesis
holds, then transition raises the value of educated  labor, causing a shift in relative demand toward
skilled labor in every sector.
Employment by Education Group.  Table 6 reports absolute and relative changes in
employment by industry over a five year period spanning the transition.  Employment  changes vary
from no change in Finance, Insurance  and Real Estate (FIRE) to a 31 percent employment reduction
in Construction. Despite the tremendous  range of changes in overall employment,  demand reductions
are always largest for the lowest education  group.  Overall, employment  for those with less than an
elementary degree fell 38 percent over the five year period.  Over the same period, emnployment  for
university graduates rose 3 percent.  The number in brackets represents  the employment  change in the
education  group relative to the overall change in employment. Employment  for the least educated
group fell 23 percentage points more than the fall in employment  overall.  Employment  for
elementary school graduates fell 4 percentage  points relative to the norm.  Meanwhile, employment
for university educated workers rose 18 percentage points.  The pattern of rising relative employment
for the more educated is consistent  with the pattern of rising relative wages for the more educated,
strongly pointing to demand-side  factors as dominating the explanations  for changing returns to
education.
Employment changes relative to industry norms are very consistent across industries. Those
with less than an elementary education  faced disproportionate  percentage  reductions in employment  in
every industry.  Those with elementary derees  lost in relative employment  in nine of eleven
industries. In contrast, those with high school educations  lost in relative employment  only in the
education  sector, while university graduates gained in relative employment  in every industry.  Thus,
some of the increase in returns to hulman  capital is due to economy-wide  shifs in relative labor25
. demand toward more educated workers.  This supports Schultz's hypothesis  that education  is
particularly valuable in disequilibrium.
Nevertheless,  low-skilled  labor  faced  additional  problems  because  of industry-specific  shocks.
The industries  with the largest emnployment  reductions  (manufacturing,  agriculture, construction,
transportation,  and services) were also those with the most low-skill  intensive production in 1987.
Industry-specific  and aggregate  demand shocks combined to raise relative returns to educated labor.
It seems clear that demand-side  factors are driving up relative wages for educated labor, but it
may not be clear if this is in response to disequilibrium  which existed before transition or after
transition.  In other words, did low relative wages for skilled labor under socialism cause insufficient
supply of skilled workers?  If so, removing constraints  on wage variation alone are responsible  for
rising reurns to skill.  However, there is little evidence  that firms were constrained  in their abilities
to hire skilled labor.  Relative costs of obtaining college  degrees were also low in socialist countries.
Universities  were free, students were paid stipends, and in some countries, even families of university
students received compensation. In addition, central assignment of occupational  choices helped assure
that needed skills were acquired.  Therefore, rising relative wages and employment  for educated
workers in Slovenia appears to be due to shifts in relative labor demand associated  with transition and
not just a market correction for preexisting disequilibriuid.
Employment by Experience Group.  The story for employment  by experience  group is more
complex. The top of Table 7 reports 1987 and 1992 employment  shares for various gender and
experience  groups as well as relative employment  changes  over the five year period.  Consistent  with
rising relative wages for more experienced  workers, employment  shares rise through twenty-nine
years of experience  for males and through twenty-four  years of experience  for females. Then,
relative employment  declines precipitously  for the experience  groups who received  the highest returns
to experience. For males. employment  for those with 30-34 years of experience  fell to 72 percent of26
the 1987 level, while employment  for those with 35 or more years of experience  fell to 33 percent of
the 1987 level.  For women, the employment  reductions began five years earlier at 25-29 years of
experience. Because  these relative employment reductions  were accompanied  by wage increases  for
these highest experience groups, supply-side factors must be driving the increasing returns to
experience at the highest levels of experience.
The timing of employment  reductions in the male and female experience  profiles coincides
with the experience criteria by which men and women qualify for the pension program.  Before  April
1992, women qualified  for pension at 30 years of experience  and 50 years of age, roughly the time
when the sharp increase in wages is observed.  Men qualify  for pension at age 55 and 35 years of job
experience, roughly the time when the rate of wage increase accelerates. It is likely thatAhe  sharp
increase in returns to experience at older ages is related to the pension program.
The reductions in employment for workers in these experience classes are largely driven by
retirements.  At the bottom of Table 7, the proportion of those employed at the beginning of the year
who retire during the year are listed for various years and experience  groups.  There is no substantial
change in these retirement rates before 1989. However, retirement rates explode upward for those
employed on January 1, 1990. The sharp increase  begins five years earlier in the experience  profile
for women than men, coinciding  with the five year difference in minimum experience  requirements
for the pension.  The increases begin five years before the experience criteria take effect, reflecting
efforts to encourage early retirements. The proportion of women with 30-34 years of experience  who
retire rises from .164 in 1989 to .425 in 1990 and then .355 in 1991. Retirements are larger than
total employment  reductions for women with over 25 years of experience. The story for men is the
same, but with a five year lag.  Retirements are larger than total employment  reductions for males
with over 30 years of experience.27
-The  upward explosion in retirements over this period is not an illusion.  Pensions  as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product rose from 9.3 percent in 1989  to 11.0 percent in 1991; and to
13.9 percent in 1993.  Perhaps the surge in retirements  was due to a prevailing  societal belief that,
because unemployment  would inevitably  accompany  the transition, older workers should retire to
make room for young workers.  However, it is quite likely that these retirements are driven more by
increasing value of the pension relative to remaining employed than by social obligations. Pensions
were indexed to inflation, while wages were less rigidly tied to price changes. With declining  real
wages for all groups, pensions would have risen relative to wages.  However, the hyperinflation  at
the end of 1989 undoubtedly  accelerated  the increase in value of indexed  pensions relative to
unindexed  wages.
The increase in relative value of pensions would have been highest  for the low-skilled. Those
groups faced the largest proportional  decreases in real wages.  At the same time, pension levels were
tied to labor market earnings which had been artificially  high for the least skilled under pretramsition
policies which mitigated earnings differences  between skills.  As a result, as shown in Table 8,
retirements were disproportionately  concentrated  among the least skilled. The least skilled also had
the highest propensity to retire before transition, but the difference  in retirement rates between  the
most and least educated increased in 1990, especially for women.
It seems clear that the pension policy has contributed  to the observed increase in returns to
experience  for those of pensionable  age.  There are two possible ways  that increased  retirements
cause the relative wage increase. The first is that the pension policy induced  a large exodus of highaly
experienced  workers, so that they became scarce relative to demand. Firms bid up wages for workers
qualifying for pensions to keep them fom  retiring.  Another possibility is suggested  by the
observation  that retrements increased the most among the least skilled. Those who decided  not to
retire in this period had higher observed skills, and may also have had higher unobserved  human- AW-r
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capital. The observed  increase  in returns  to experience  for pensionable  workers  may  not be that  those
remaining  enployed  are receiving  large  wage  increases,  but rather  that only high  wage  experienced
workers  are remaining  employed.
Distinguishing  between  the relative  scarcity  versus  heterogeneity  in skill hypotheses  will
require  more  detailed  study of the retirement  decision  and individual  wage  growth.  However,  the
*>  observed  wages  for experienced  workers  are a measure  of lost  productivity  from retirees  of similar
skills. The lost output  from the pension  policy  would  be higher  if the relative  scarcity  hypothesis
holds  because  the observed  wages  of employed  workers  would  be unbiased  neasures of what  retirees
would  earn if they  were still employed. Nevertheless,  even  if only the least  productive  workers
retired,  the observed  wage/experience  profile  represents  an upper-bound  measure  of lost production
for the marginal  retiree. Both interpretations  suggest  that lost  productivity  from increased  retirements
were substantial.
While  the pension  policy  was successful  in encouraging  retirements,  it did not increase  jobs
for the young. Employment  shares  for the least-experienced  fell, while  employment  shares  for those
just under  pensionable  age rose. Presumably  those  near  pensionable  age are close  substitLtes  in
production  with those  who retired,  while  the least-experienced  are  not close  substitutes. In fac  if
inexperienced  and experienced  workers  are complements  in production,  policies  which  led to reduced
employment  of the most-experienced  workers  also  led to reduced  employment  for young  workers.
Employment  by Gender. Women  gained  in relative  pay and  relative  employment.
Reurning  to Table  6, it seems  clear that  the relative  gains  in women's  employment  are due to their
relative  concenton  in sectors  which  were less adversely  affected  by the transition. Men  were
concentrated  in manufacturing,  agriculture,  constructon,  transportation/communication,  and services,
all of which  lost employment  more  than  average. Women  were concentrated  in sectors  which  did
better. Within  industries,  women  were not more  likely  to retain  employment  than  men. In fact,  male4i.--<-  29
eniployment  shares rose in seven Af  t  eleven sectors, although  most changes  were small.  These
results suggest hat the gains made by women are due to industry-specific  demand side factors which
adversely affected  predominantly  male industries.
5.  WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT CHANGES AND LABOR MARKET POLICY
The disruption of what had been a very stable economic  system created large shifts in labor
demand across industries, skills, experience  groups, and geographic areas in the formerly socialist
economies. These large shifts occurred over a very short period of time.  The fortunate were those
occupying  sectors of the earlier system which faced smaller disruptions in labor demand. Workers in
those sectors received a relative quasi-rent from the positions they occupied. The unfortmate in
sectors which shrank or collapsed faced a relative loss.  Identifying  the relative winners and losers
during transition will aid in the shift of labor toward its most productive uses, those sectors in which
relative quasi-rents  have risen.
The stylized facts regarding changes  in wages and employment  during the Slovenian  transition
to a more market-oriented  economy can be summarized  very briefly, despite the lengthy, detailed
investigation  reported above- The facts are:
P  Relative  wages and employment  rose for the most educated  and fell for the least educated.
The apparent shift in relative labor demand toward the most educated  occurs in all industries.
*  Relative wages and employment  rise with years of work experience  until pensionabie  age.
These results are consistent with shifts in relative labor demand  for more experienced
workers.
At pensionable  age, relative wages increase very rapidly and relative employment
plummets. The effect is consistent  with a labor supply shock for pensionable  age workers.30
--  Women gain relative to men in both wages and employment. Relative  returns to women's
characteristics  became more similar to male returns to those characteristics. Women's gains
are attributable  to women disproportionately  occupying  education  and industry groups which
were treated more favorably by the transition, not to economy-wide  reductions  in
discrimination  against women.
*n Wage inequality increases. Wage variation increases between  skill groups, within skill
groups, within groups with identical industry and human  capital characteristics,  and across
firms within an industry. These large changes in relative wages should signal future
reallocation  of labor toward more productive, higher paying sectors.
The litmus test for labor market policy impacts is whether the policy changes are consistent
with these labor market outcoomes.  In Slovenia, the policy story seems clear.  Disabling  the
taxltrmsfer policy from relatively profitable to relatively unprofitable  finns and eliminating  worker
referenda on wage scales removed mechanisms which served to compress wage variation. As a
result, returns to human capital rose rapidly, both for education  and experience. Additionally,
relive  labor demand was growing for the more skilled, due both to cconomy-wide  factors such as
the need for more human capital to cope with uncertainty,  and to industry-specific  fIctors which
lowered demand particularly for low-skill intensive  industries.
Policies which actively encouraged  retirements were tremendously effective  in lowering
employment  for women over 50 and men over 55.  Such policies were more successful at reducing
employment  than legalization  of layoffs, since (in the period studied)  costs assessed  to firms for
layoffs  were severe. The policy was so effective  that it may have caused firms to bid up wages for
pensionable  aged workers to prevent them from retiring.  Alternatively, it may have caused  a
selection  process by which only the highest  paid pensionable  age workers remained  in the labor force.
In either case, the outcomes suggest that the pension policy has proven very costly for Slovenia, both31
in terms of the drain on GDP needed to meet pension obligations  and from the lost production  from
*  ~- -reirees.  At the same  time, the retirements  did not 'make room' for young workers.  Employment
shares for the least-experienced  frll, while employment  shares rose for those who were the closest
substitutes  to the retirees: those just under pensionable  age.
Incomes  policies which set minimum  wages, fixed ranges of pay, and indexed wages to
inflation  did not prevent increases in wage variation from occurring. Wage minimums did not appear
to have an effect, presumably because inflation  reduced real minimum  wages so quickly that most
workers were paid above the minimums. In fact, wage distributions  showed no signs of massing at
the lower tail, indicating  no evidence  of effective  minimum  wages.'  Since 1991, inflation has been
more or less controlled, so these incomes policies may have becorne  more effective in recent years.
There are two caveats that should be acknowledged. First, the analysis above does not
incorporate  benefits, but only wages.  To the extent that many benefits, health insurance, pensions,
and unemployment  insurance, are universal, they would tend to reduce the variance in compensation,
relative to the variance in wages.  Fixed benefits would not effect the marginal returns to schooling.
experience, and gender which underlie the other analysis however. Nor is it clear that inclusion  of
benefits  would reduce measured inequality. Deregulation  of compensation  may have allowed firms to
increase the variety and amount of perquisites offered  to employees, particularly  to those at the upper-
bound of allowable  wages.
The second caveat is that we cannot incorporate  private sector wages into our analysis.
However it is unlikely that the conclusions  reported herein are driven by movements  of workers into
the private sector.  As discussed in the data section, changes  in social and private sector shares on
nonagricultural  employment  between 1987  and 1991  were small. Furthermore, these changes  were
dominated  by lost employment  from the social sector, not by voluntary  exits into the private sector.
2These  wage  distributions  are available  from  the authors  on request.p..
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Nevertheless, the private sector has continued to grow in relative importance,  and it will be important
for future research to incorporate information  on wage changes in that sector.33
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Data  Appendix
This Appendix  reviews  the procedures  used  to merge  and clean  data  from the four  sources,
the Slovenian  Pension  and  'Invalid  Fund (SPIF),  the data  on registered  unemployed  provided  by the
Employment  Office  of Slovenia,  and  the data on wage  history  of individuals  and  the register  of
enterprises  compiled  by the Statistical  Office  of Slovenia.  The initial  sample  was drawn  from  the
wage  history  data, and the other  data  was merged  using  common  individual  and enterprise
identification  codes.
A random  sample  of just under  five percent  of workers  employed  in the social  sector  on
December  31, 1986  was selected. The initial  sample  was supplemented  by a five  percent  random
sample  of entrants  and  reentrants  during  the period 1987  to 1991. Reentrants  were  eligible  for
selection  only if they  were excluded  from earlier  selections  to avoid  double  counting. Over  the five
year period,  46,102  individuals  entered  the sample  at least  one year.
The data  set on work history  allows  us to trace individuals'  employment  spells  from 1987  to
mid-1992,  and thus  enables  us to determine  the years  for which  SPEF  should  have  earnings  records.
For workers  who  do not change  employers  during  the year, one  earnings  record  is reported  to SPIF;
for workers  who  switch  employers  during  the year,  there are as many  records  reported  as there  are
employers.  The number  of these  spells,  together  with statistics  on records  actally provided,  are
reported  in Table  Al.  The number  of records  used in analysis  ranges  from 76 percent  of eligible
employment  spells  in 1988  to 60 percent  of such  spells  in 1991.
The most  common  reason  for the omission  of an eligible  spell  was the failure  of SPIF  to
supply  earnings  records  of individuals  included  in the sample. SPIF  has not insisted  that records
provided  by employers  use identification  numbers  common  to other  government  agencies,  so some
include  only the idiosyncratic  SPIF identification  codes. Such  records  could  not  be merged  with
employment  spells  of individuals  included  in our sample. Tbere  is no reason  to suspect  that
i:ndividuals  in the nonmatched  set differ  systematically  from  those  in the matched  set.
Up to four  percent  of the supplied  earnings  records  tumed  out to be multiple  records  on the
same  employment  spell. Such multiple  records  were  collapsed  into a single  record.  On occasion,
employers  made  corrections  on an individual's  record,  and  both the original  record  and the
subsequent  correction  are kept  on the individual's  file. However,  the SPIF  did not record  which  was
the correct  record. Based  of the SPIF's instuctions  for filing  corrections,  we were able  to collapse
multiple  records  into one as follows:  In the case  of exact  duplicate  records,  one to three  percent  of the
annual  total, only  one record  was retained. If the duplicate  earnings  deviated  less  than 10  percent,
0.1 to 0.3 percent  of the total, one record  was retained. Records  of the "leveiing"  type (0.5  to 0.8
percent),  in which  earnings  on one record  were  less  than  25 percent  of the earnings  of the other,
earnings  were summed  up. The hyperinflation  during  1989  created  particularly  severe  problems  of
multiple  records. The falling  currency  value  caused  inflated  earnings  amounts  which  exceeded  the
number  of digits  reserved  for earnings  on SPIFs preprinted  filing  forms. To compensate,  earnings
were reported  on several  lines. Since  these  records  typically  had  several  lines  with all nines  in the
earning columns  and then  a last record  with a smaller  amount,  it was usually  apparent  that  the
eamings  amounts  should  be summed  to get the full amount Nonetheless,  the need  to make  more
corrections  in 1989  than in other  years may  mean  that computed  wages  in 1989  are less  precise.
Further  attenuation  of records  was caused  by incomplete  mergmg  of the cleaned  earnings  data
with data on human  capital  characteristics  and  the emnployer  from the work history  data set, and with
industry  of employer  from  the enterprise  data  set. In addition,  some  individuals  included  in the
sample  exited  from the social  sector  into self-employment  or private  sector  employment  and were  thus
excluded.e37
The  decreased  sample  size  in 1991  is due  to a lag  in data  collection  by SPIF. When  we
recived  the data  in October  1993, SPIF  was  still  collecting  data  for 1991  and had  just started  to
collect  data  for 1992. Finns  ave  supposed  to submit  earnings  data  for one  year  to SPIF  by May  of
the *Nowing  year. In practice,  employers  submit  them  wit  significant  delays. Further  delays  occur
if data  fail  logical  control,  in which  case  employers  must  submit  corrections.
For the social  sedor employment  spells  included  in  our analysis,  data  are of good  quality.
SPIP  has a monitoring  system  with its own  site inspectors  to validate  accuracy. Moreover,  employers
have  to report their  payroll  to the Social  Accounting  Service  (a government  agency  that  performs
accounting  auditing)  and thus a cross-check  of reported  information  is possible.38
Table Al
Patentd  and  Actual  Earniap Records  by Proceshg  Stage
1987  19"  1989  1990  199
Elgible  employment  47,350  46,703  46635  44,746  40.895
SPIF sppied  meords  42,247  41.078  70.802  37306  30.560
After  copsIg  muliple  40.688  40,053  38,402  36.579  29.873
recordB  to ouc record
After merging  wkh work  35,184  35,352  32,785  31,110  24.518
hiy  and cmplyer  data  -39
Table I
Comparison  of Earmazgs  Distribution, 1989
. |  *.  ~~~~~~~~~~~~(Gini  Coemcicnt)
(G:i  C.Gini  CocMcknL
Slovenia  22.0
Czcchoslovakia  19.9
Hungary (1988)  25.6
Poland  19.7
Notc:  Data rcfcr to nct carnings in the state scctor.
Source:  Branko  Milanovic. wIncome  DistrLbution  in Eastem Europe  during the Transition"  (World  Bank.  Washington.
D.C., 1991.  rescarch proposal):  Saiisticat YearbookcofSloveniae  (Ljubljana:  Statistical  Office  of Lhe  Republic
of Slovenia. 1990).-￿  . 40
Table 2
Slovenla Wage Equations by Sex, 1987 and  191
(L-stausucs in parentheses)
Male Waste Enuatlon  Female Waste Euation
Variable  1987  1991  Change  1987  1991  Change
Educadon
Elcmcnuty  .044  .107  .063  .079  .112  .033
(5.28)  (6.17)  (3.64)  (10.10)  (6.16)  (1.87)
Vocational  .163  .201  .038  .164  .183  .018
(23.5,  (13.8)  (2.58)  (19.9)  (9.60)  (0.98)
Middle School  .319  .406  .087  .370  .465  .095
(40.0)  (24.6)  (5.22)  (44.9)  (24.9)  (5.16)
UniversiLy  .520  .677  .156  .569  .685  .116
(2 years)  (43.3)  (27.7)  (6.28)  (50.9)  (28.5)  (4.80)
University  .715  .943  .228  .768  .940  .171
(4 years)  (61.8)  (41.5)  (9.75)  (59.3)  (35.2)  (6.26)
Experienc  .019  .018  -.001  .019  .011  -.008
(22.2)  (10.2)  (.57)  (19.6)  (5.14)  (3.60)
Experience  21100  -.027  -.019  .007  -.019  .012  .032
(11.3)  (3.35)  (1.35)  (6.55)  (1.57)  (4.31)
Non Slovene  .023  .003  -.020  -.004  -.019  -.014
(3.41)  (.24)  (1.43)  (0.55)  (1.17)  (0.89)
Fixed  Term  -.038  -.003  .008  .007  -.017  -.023
(1.48)  (1.13)  (.20)  (0.37)  (6.69)  (0.74)
Intern-Pnimnent  -.035  -.178  -.144  -.057  -.057  -.000
(.40)  (2.09)  (1.10)  (0.66)  (0.69)  (0.00)
Inern-FPixed Term  -.149  -.197  -.047  -.111  -.208  -.096
(-3.93)  (6.05)  (.85)  (2.58)  (5.88)  (1.46)
Month  Dummies  inc.  inc.  inc.  inc.
Industry  Dummies  inc.  imc.  inc.  inc.
N  15,884  10,822  14,590  10,376
.428  .342  .461  .313
F(11.n7  11.6  8.74
Note:
Test of the null hypothesis  that the human capital,  ethnicity and term or  employment  coefficient  are cqual  in 1987 and 1991.
n represents  the degrees  of freedom  in the unconstrained  equation.41
of, Vii,i  -.  -Table  3
Coeffdrets  of Varlation of Real Wage by SUbgr-JP,  1987-199
Year
SubKrouo
FAucain  1987  19W9  1991
Less Than Elementary  .36  .44  .43
Elementary  .51  .49  .57
. *-  - Vocational  .48  .47  .38
Middle School  .43  .47  .42
- DUniversity  (2)  .37  .39  .47
Univenity (4)  .28  .40  .45
Exonerince
0-3 Yeas  .61  .53  .57
11-20 Years  .52  .S6  .52
>20 Years  .42  .48  .56
Gender
Male  .49  .57  .55
Female  .49  .50  .56
Residual Standard Deviation
.30  .40  .49
.29  .47  .5142
Table 4
Differences  in Returns to CharacterItics Behween  Mals
and Females  in Sloveaba 1987-1991
Variable  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Educaion
Elementary  .035  .013  .007  .020  .005
(3.09)  (1.16)  (0.41)  (1.02)  (0.19)
Vocational  .001  -.014  -.005  -.012  -.018
(0.11)  (1.39)  (0.30)  (0.63)  (0.77)
Middle  School  .051  .032  .026  .018  .059
(4.43)  (2.89)  (1.44)  (0.94)  (2.36)
University  .048  .015  .019  .024  .008
(2-  ycars)  (2.93)  (0.96)  (0.73)  (0.87)  (0.23)
University  .054  .057  .055  .006  -.004
(4 yeas)  (3.08)  (3.49)  (2.05)  (0.21)  (0.10)
Experience  -.000  -.001  .006  -.006  -.007
(0.06)  (0.85)  (3.22)  (2.81)  (2.44)
.:  Experience  2/100  .007.  .011  -.004  .031  .032
(1.98)  (3.01)  (0.61)  (4.54)  (3.27)
Non  Slovene  -.028  -.011  .003  .007  -.022
(2.71)  (1.16)  (0.19)  (0.43)  (1.05)
Fixed  Term  .045  .057  .045  .117  .013
(1.43)  (2.22)  (1.33)  (3.88)  (0.37)
Intern-Permanent  -.022  -.014  -.026  .141  .121
(0.18)  (0.18)  (0.26)  (1.41)  (1.02)
Intern-Fixed  Term  .038  -.055  -.006  -.016  -.011
(0.66)  (1.23)  (0.13)  (0.38)  (0.23)
F(11,n  8.2  8.8  7.6  6.0  3.2
F(21, n9  11.3  9.7  9.4  7.8  4.2
t-fatucs  in parenlbeas
'Test of thejoist hypoihesis  dixt  the U  coefficiers are eq  across  the maue  and femade  wg  equations.
"rTet  of dIe  joint hypothesis dat tie I coefficintis and h  ten industry dimuny  variales are  equsl as.  the male  an  fale  wage equadons,43
. .i.  I..-..
Table 5
A. Cbange  In Female/Male  Log Wage  Differentials  and Relative  Wage  Disbibudons
Standardi7ed  Residual  Standardized  Residual
Controlling for Human  Controlling For All
Obscrved  Capital  Variables
Year  Difference  Position'  Diffemnce  Position'  Diffcrence'  Position'
1987  -.13  35  -.45  28  -.50  26
1988  -.12  36  -.47  30  -.54  27
1989  -.13  31  -.38  31  -.45  2S
1990  -.A1  39  -.26  33  -.34  28
1991  -.10  40  -.25  33  -.30  30
3.  Decomposition of  Change in  Female/Male Log Wage Differential'
1987-1989  1989-1991  1987-1991
Observed Change  -.002  -.028  -.030
1. Observed X's  -.005  -.014  -.012
2.  Observed Prices  -.024  016  -.014
3.  Gap  -.022  -.073  -.100
4.  Unobsenred Prices  .049  .043  .097
GcnderSpecific (1+3)  -.026  -.087  -.113
Wage Scture  (2+4)  -025  .059  .083
Expaiued  (1+2)  -.029  .002  -.026
Unexplained  (3+4)  .027  -.030  -.003
Estimated  as average  ln(W 1) minus  average  In (W.)-
b Percntile  position of median female in the  male earnings distribution.
Average value of O,, as defined below equation (3) in the texL
dBased  on fully specified wage equation including industry  dummy vanables.44
Table 6
Chauge in Employment by Education and  Industry,  January  1, 1987 to January  1, 1992
Industry  Education Levol
Loss Than  Elementary  Vocational  Middle  University  Total  Low Skill  Male  Industry
Elementary  School  Share'  Share  Share
Manufacturing  .62'  .79  .85  .87  .90  .78  .50  .56  .44
[-.161'  V-.011  [.071  1.091  1.121
Agriculture/  .59  .80  .95  .89  .81  .80  .45  .66  .03
Formstry  [-.211  [.001  [.151  1.091  [.Dll
Construction  .60  .71  .70  .77  .81  .69  .45  .89  .7
[1-091  [.021  [.01]  [.081  [.12]
Transportation/  .65  .77  .85  1.01  .91  .83  .38  .81  .05
Communication  [-.I81  1.061  [.02]  1-181  [.081
Trade  .64  .88  .90  1.08  1.18  .94  .21  .38  .08
[-.30]  [-.06]  1-.041  [.141  1.241
Services  .64  .76  .76  .93  1.15  .78  .36  .64  .07
[-.14]  [-.02]  [-.021  [.15]  [.371
P.l.R.E.  .63  .94  1.11  1.00  1.11  1.00  .23  .46  .05
[-.37]  [-.06]  1.111  [.00]  [.11]
Education  .67  .89  .91  .86  1.09  .95  .17  .34  .06
[-.281  [-.061  1-.041  [-.091  1.121
Health  .71  .95  .93  1.03  1.06  .97  .27  .17  .06
[-.261  (-.021  [-.041  [.06]  [.09]
Government  .50  .77  .98  .92  1.00  .92  .16  .36  .03
[-.421  (-.15]  [.061  1.001  [.08]
Industry Missing  .52  1.10  1.52  1.59  1.51  1.25  .36  .63  .03
[--731  [-.151  [.27]  [.341  [.26)
Total  .62  .81  .88  .95  1.03  .85  .39  .54  1.0
[--23]  [-.04]  [.03]  1.101  [.181  1.0
Share of education
group in total
employment, 1987  .19  .20  .29  .21  .11
' Employment  share for those with an elementary education or less. 1987.
b  Male Employment  share totl  in 1987.
'Industry  share of employment  in 1987.
d  Rato  of 1991 employmcnt relative to 1987 employmet  in the industry/education  group cell.
'Difference between percent change of employment  in industry-education  cell and perccnt change in industry employment.45
Table 7
Cbange In Relative  Employment  by Experience  Group and Gender
January 1, 1987  to January I, 1992
-xoerience Group  Mab  Fcmale
1987 Short  1992 Share  Ratiob  1937 Share  1992 Share  RaLlo'
0-9 years  .330  .318  .80  .359  .330  .78
10-19  yewa  .329  .345  .87  .358  .387  .92
20-24 years  .127  .135  .88  .118  .148  1.07
25-29 years  .100  .120  1.00  .105  .096  .78
30-34 years  .076  .066  .72  .053  .036  .58
35+  years  .038  .015  .33  .007  .003  .31
Total  1.00  1.00  .83  1.00  1.00  .86
Proportion  of Employed Who Retire  Within the  Year, By Gender and  Experience Group
January  1, 1987 to January  1, 1992
Year
Experince  Group  1987  1989  1990  1991
20-24  Male  .007  .009  .012  .011
Female  .019  .020  .029  .014
25-29  Male  .021  .025  .029  .031
Female  .033  .048  .092  .087
30-34  Male  .071  .082  .148  .158
Female  .127  .164  .425  .355
35 +  Male  .250  .267  .579  .403
Female  .513  .522  .788  .400
Total  Male  .019  .021  .08  .027
Femak  .018  .023  .049  .033
UGroup  EmplaymfL  as.  prapopria of the Wa
Rato  or  192  laymat  to 1987  eaoymant46
Table B
Proportion  of Employed  Who Reilre  Within  the  Year,
by Education Level and Gender,  1967 to 1991
Proportion of MRaes  Retlring
Less Than  Elementary  Vocational  High School  University  Total
Elemcentary
1987  .034  .016  .014  .019  .009  .019
1989  .038  .020  .015  .018  .016  .021
1990  .059  .027  .034  .040  .028  .038
1991  .055  .019  .020  .025  .024  .027
Proportion of Females Retiring
1987  .045  .019  .012  .010  .008  .018
1989  .063  .024  .013  .012  .011  .023
1990  .123  .051  .038  .029  .025  .049
1991  .080  .039  .036  .030  .025  .03447
F  igure 1:  Index of Relative Wages by Education,  1987-1991






_",>!,#  _:.  ;  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  UAVRITEE
1105
105 1
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
YEAR
LTELEM=Lcs than  lclaentaiy  VOCAThVocatiowli  UNIVERZ=2  Years of University
ELEM-Elementaiy  Midde=Mddle  School  UNrVER4-4 Years of  UnivemsityPercent
change  in  Figure 2: Returns to Experience by Experience Group, 1987 and 1991









0  I  -- II  'II  ------------ 
0  4  7.5  12.5  17.5  22.5  27.5  32.5  37.5










0  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000  3500  4000  4500
REAL  WAGE  RATE50
Figure 4: Percentage Change in Real Wage
from 1987  to 1991, by Percentile
-0.2
-0.4.................  .
. ~ ~  ~  ~  -.
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Real Wage PercentilePolicy  Reuearch Working  Piper  Series
Contaci
Title  Author  Dale  for paper
WPS1319  The Financial  System  and  Public  Ashl  DomirgOg-Kuni  July  1994  B.  Moorm
Enterprise  Reform:  Concepts  and  Rosa  Levine  35281
Cases
WPS  1320  Capital  Struclures  In  Developing  Aslh  Demirgflg-Kuni  July  1994  B.  Moore
Countries:  Evidence  from  Ten  VoJlsiav  MaksimDvic  35261
Countres
WPS1  321 Institutlons  and  the  East  Asian  Jose  Edgardo  Campos  July 1994  B.  Moore
Miracle:  Asymmetric  Information,  Donald  Lien  35261
Rent-Seeking,  and the Deliberation
Counicil
WPS1322  Reducing  Regulatory  Barriers  to  Barbara  Richard  July  1994  M.  Dhokai
Private-Sector  Participation  In  Latin  Thelma  Trlche  33970
America's  Waler  and  Sanitation  Services
WPS1S23  Energy  Pricing  and  Air Pollution:  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  July 1994  C. Jones
Econometric  Evidence  from  Emmanuel  Jimenez  37699
Manufacturing  In  Chile  and  Indonesia Liii  Liu
WPS  1324  Voucher  Funds  in  Transitional  Robert  E.  Anderson  July 1994  F. Hatab
Economies:  The  Czech  and  Slovak  35835
Experience
WPS1325  The Economics  of Research  and  Anwar  Shah  July  1994  C.  Jones
Development:  How  Research  and  37699
Development  Capital  Affects  Production
and  Markets  and  Is  Affected  by  Tax
Incentives
WPS1326  Banks,  Capital  Markets,  and  Gerhard  Pohi  July  1994  L H-ovseplan
Corporate  Governance:  Lessons  Stljn  Claessens  37297
from Russia  for Easter  Europe
WPS1327  Is  the  Debt  Crisis  History?  Recent  Michael  Dooley  July 1994  S. King-Watson
Private  Capital  Inflows  to Developing Eduardo  Fernandez-Arias  31047
Countries  Kenneth  Kletzer
WPS1328  The  Use  of  New  York  Cotton  Futures Panos  Varangis  July  1994  D. Gustafson
Contracts  to Hedge  Cotton  Price  Risk Elton  Thigpen  33714
in Developing  Countries  Sudhakar  Satyanarayan
WP  C1329  The Regulation  and  Supervision  of  David  H. Scott  August'1994  K.  Waelti
Domestic  Financial  Conglomerates  37655
WPS1330  Revenue  Uncertainly  and  the  ChoAic Delfin  S.  Go  Augusl  1994  C.  Jones
of  Tax  Instrument  during  the  Transition  37699
in Easten  EurpePolicy  Resaearch  Working  Paper  Serles
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  pmper
WPS1331 The Myth  of Monopoly:  A New  View  Annette  N. Brown  August 1994  M. Berg
of Industrial Structure  In Russia  Barry W. Ickes  36969
Randi FRyternan
WPS1332 Poverty and Household  Size  Peler  Lanjouw  August 1994  P. Cook
Martin Ravalglon  33902
WPS1333 A Test of the  lntemalional  Norman  V. Loayza  August 1994  R. Martin
Convergence  Hypothesis  Using  39026
Panel  Data
WPS1334 Taxation. Public Services.-  and the  Juan 1 9raun  August 1994  R. Martin
Informal  Sector In  a Model  of  Norman  V. Loayza  39026
Endogenous  Growth
WPS1335 Labor  Regulations  and ths Informal  Norman  V. Loayza  August 1994  R. Martin
Economy  39026
WPS1336 Modenizing Payment  Systems  in  Robert Listfield  August 1994  F. Montes-Negret
Emerging  Economies  Femando  Montes-Negret  37832
WPS1337 The Countrywide  Effects  of Aid  Howard  White  August 1994  E. Khine
Joke Luttik  37471
WPS1338 Commodity  Exports  and the Adding-  Maurice Schilf  August 1994  A. [im
Up Problem  in Developing  Countries:  33715
Trade, Investment,  and Lending  Policy
WPS1339 China's Emergence:  PRospects,  Andres Boltho  August 1994  J. Queen
Opportunities,  and Challenges  Un Dadush  33740
Dong  He
Shigeru Otsubo
WPS1340 Opportunity Cost and Prudentialityr  Herbert  L Baer  August 1994  P. Sintim-Aboagye
An Analysis of Futures  Clearinghouse  Virginia  G. France  38526
Blehavior  James  T. Moser
WPS1341 Explaining Pakistan's  High Growth  Sadiq  Ahmed  August 1994  A. Bhalia
Performnance  Over the Past Two  84440
Decades:  Can It Be Sustained?
WPS1342 Winners and Losers  in Transition:  Peter  F. Orazem  August 1994  J. Walker
Retums  to Education,  Experience,  Milan Vodapivec  37466
and Gender  in Slovenia
WPS1343 Strategic Interdependence  in the  Wafik Grais  August 1994  K Zheng
East-West  Gas  Trade: A Hierarchical Kangbin  Zheng  36974
Stackelberg  Game  Approach